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1 Anyone Can Read a Book 
 
Undoubtedly The Scientific Image has been one of these few books that really had a profound 
impact on the philosophy of science during the last decades. Exaggerating only a little, one 
could even say that trying to refute van Fraassen’s position in that book soon became one of 
the standard exercises that one had to pass to qualify as a truly realist philosopher. And who 
didn’t want to be a realist (in one of its many guises)? Luckily enough for the community of 
professional philosophers of science there were many theses in the book that were deemed 
controversial enough to be subjected to unremitting refutation. 
 I have no commitments to being a realist, and the position that I will take in this paper 
is that of the friendly commentator. Hence, my primary intention will be to uncover the 
arguments for constructive empiricism, rather than to criticise them. A considerable part of 
the paper will be devoted to showing that, contrary to the received reading, van Fraassen 
nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his arguments in The Scientific Image. 
For understandable reasons, engaging in exegetical exercises is not the most fashionable 
enterprise in analytic philosophy of science. As a critical commentator put it after my 
presentation of an earlier version of this paper: “anyone can read a book.” One should not be 
afraid, however, to enter into such an exercise when occasion demands it. Given the many 
misinterpretations of van Fraassen’s position, the present case does.  
 Obviously, my reading shows many criticisms of van Fraassen’s position to have been 
misguided. Understanding that the major anti-realist position does not need the argument from 
underdetermination might also force a reconsideration of many realist positions, since these 
are often fashioned just to ward off the underdetermination threat. Finally, as van Fraassen 
has been developing a much broader program in empiricist philosophy since the publication 
of The Scientific Image (see especially van Fraassen [1989] and van Fraassen [2002]), a clear 
picture of where he started from is of the utmost importance in judging this program, and 
properly understanding its background. 
 It should be clear that I am not just interested in setting the historical record straight 
for its own sake (although I do believe that this has some value). I hope that this 
reconsideration of The Scientific Image might help in reconceiving the terms of the debate, for 
realists and anti-realists alike. I do also hope it might help make anti-realists of us all 
(although I do not believe it will). Finally, I hope that it might stand as a methodological 
reminder for philosophers of science. We all can read books, but sometimes it is useful to read 
them again. 
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2 The Argument from Underdetermination 
 
In this section, I will describe a basic version of the argument from underdetermination 
(henceforth: UD). I will also sketch the different families of rebuttals, but without going into 
much detail. My presentation is primarily intended to set the stage for the following sections. 
For more detailed discussions, one can always consult one of the many excellent textbooks 
(e.g. Kukla [1998], Psillos [1999], Ladyman [2002]).1  
 The argument in one of its basic forms consists of two premises, from which one can 
logically deduce the falsity of scientific realism. The first premise is a logico-semantic thesis, 
which is sometimes taken to be further justified by historical evidence: 
 (1) All theories have empirically equivalent rivals. 
(The equivalence consists in something like the claim that the rivals have exactly the same 
empirical consequences – whether these consequences are delineated sententially or in model-
theoretic terms does not matter for the moment.) The second premise is a presumed 
epistemological principle: 
(2) Since empirically equivalent theories are equally supported by all possible 
evidence, all of them will always be equally believable. 
Taken together, (1) and (2) imply: 
 (UD) Belief in any theory must be arbitrary and unfounded. 
Most philosophers of science tend to be critical of both premises. I will first introduce the 
kind of arguments that is most often levelled against the first premise. This thesis is normally 
introduced as following from logico-semantic considerations, because it contains a universal 
quantifier. It is impossible to establish that all theories have empirical equivalent rivals on the 
basis of just a handful of historical examples (barring some kind of inductive rule of inference 
– but how should that look when the instances are taken to be theories?). Such examples can 
establish at most that in some particular cases it would be unreasonable to believe in a theory. 
Since this is not enough to sustain the grand conclusions attributed to the argument, most 
criticisms focus on the untenability of the logico-semantic considerations. 
                                                 
1 Laudan [1990], Laudan and Leplin [1991], Hoefer and Rosenberg [1994], Stanford [2001], Devitt [2002], 
Okasha [2002], and Norton [200+] are recent articles on the topic, bringing forward some of the arguments 
surveyed in this section (especially Laudan and Leplin [1991] has generated some extended discussions). 
Earman [1993], and Douven and Horsten [1998] try to exploit the argument from UD in a slightly different vein 
to argue for anti-realist conclusions. 
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 One line of argument for the first premise, most strongly pushed by Kukla [1998], 
consists in showing that it is always possible to “cook up” empirically equivalent rivals. The 
most straightforward example is the following: for any theory T, construct a theory T’ which 
asserts that T is empirically adequate, but that none of its postulated theoretical entities exist. 
Still more extravagant cases can easily be introduced. The quick and easy answer to this 
strategy is that these cooked up theories are no genuine rivals. Quick and easy, and probably 
true. But true for the wrong reasons – if this is to be a criticism of the first premise of the 
argument. It seems a hopeless task to come up with a non-vacuous criterion that could serve 
to sever the serious candidates from the ones that are to be expelled out of hand.2 Well not 
quite, but a non-vacuous criterion will trade on epistemic notions, such as e.g. the initial 
plausibility of these alleged rivals, and this comes down to denying the second premise of the 
argument (see also Kukla [2001]). A more elaborate argument, really targeting the first 
premise, would have to show that isolating the empirical content of a theory is in no way 
feasible, independent of the question whether it would make sense to believe in a theory 
merely asserting that content. If this could be proven, an essential ingredient of the recipe for 
the cooking of empirically equivalent rivals would be missing. To my knowledge, no such 
argument has yet been conclusively provided. 
 A second line of argument for the first premise trades on conventionalist insights. A 
theory only has its full empirical content when conjoined with auxiliary hypotheses, and this 
gives rise to the suspicion that a theory could always be made empirically equivalent to any 
other by adding to it the right kind of auxiliary hypotheses (as in the case of different physical 
geometries that are made indistinguishable by adding exotic force functions). It seems to me 
that this line of argument is harder to establish than the first one, but let us for the moment 
suppose that this could be proven to be generally the case (there is anyway always the first 
line of argument to fall back on). Again, the most attractive answer seems to consist in 
doubting that these possible auxiliaries would have the right kind of epistemic status, e.g. that 
                                                 
2 This is especially so since such a criterion must not disqualify too many theories. Consider the case of quantum 
mechanics in both its standard Copenhagen interpretation and in the Bohmian version. It seems that on many 
possible formal criteria for when a theory is to be considered a serious rival, the standard interpretation would 
have to be expelled. On the other hand, historically the Bohmian version of quantum mechanics was clearly 
cooked up, taking the standard formalism as its starting point and adding no new empirically assessable 
information. If however the intuition that some theories are no serious rivals is based on a consideration of 
scientific practice (as many critics of premise (1) explicitly claim), then neither version of quantum mechanics 
should be faulted by a criterion supposedly making such an intuition explicit. 
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they are not plausible. Arguments against the first premise again tend to be disguised 
arguments against the second premise. It might be suspected, however, that the move bringing 
in auxiliaries might give us a direct argument against the possibility of isolating a theory’s 
empirical content, which is an essential prerequisite to give sense to the notion of empirically 
equivalent rivals. Alas, a basic move that is always open to a defender of premise (1) is to 
retreat and consider only “total theories,” that is the conjunction of a theory plus auxiliaries, 
which ex suppositio do have clear-cut empirical content – and hence can be considered to 
have empirically equivalent rivals, if only by invoking the first line of argument. That the 
warrant that we have for auxiliaries will always change over time, and that what we identify 
as the empirical content of a theory is accordingly not invariant, need not deter from this 
point. Of course, we might always be mistaken in what we isolate as the empirical content of 
a theory, but this only means that we were mistaken in considering some theories to be 
empirically equivalent, not that they cease to be empirically equivalent or that there are no 
empirical equivalent rivals. Such rivals will immediately be constructible once we have anew 
delineated the empirical content of our theory. 
 Premise (2) is closely associated with hypothetico-deductivism (H-D), since it seems 
to be predicated on the idea that all that matters to count some piece of empirical information 
as support for belief in a theory is the question whether it is entailed by that theory. But H-D 
surely is flawed as a general theory of confirmation, so premise (2) can easily be denied. It is 
flawed because direct entailment is neither necessary, nor sufficient for a piece of empirical 
information to be confirmation for a hypothesis. There is no need to go into all the details 
here, which I take to be well known anyway. Let me suffice by pointing out that none of the 
rival theories of confirmation reduce confirmation to direct entailment of the evidence (one 
can think of Glymour’s bootstrapping, Mayo’s severe testing, or Bayesianism in one of its 
many guises). What all these rival theories have in common, moreover, is that they agree on 
the fact that a richer background, against which empirical tests are conducted, must be 
brought in to assess confirmation. 
 The tendency to smuggle in a denial of the second premise while arguing against the 
first premise points to the fact that for most philosophers this is the main reason for denying 
the conclusion (UD): a methodology which only considers straightforward deductive relations 
is too poor to do justice to what really is going on in science. (Hence it also follows that a 
theory which is cooked up to respect only these relations can be no respectable scientific 
theory). Another way to state the dependence between the arguments against both premises is 
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to point out that if the equivalence asserted in premise (1) only consists in entailing the same 
empirical consequences, then it is too weak to engender a real problem of underdetermination. 
 Notice that the claim that we need more than direct entailment for something to count 
as evidence is not predicated on the idea of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Of course, 
defenders of IBE will concur with this claim, but it is a more general one, having to do with 
the question when something can be considered to be empirical evidence. One does not need 
to have recourse to contentious relations between explanatoriness and truth to make this point.  
 That the argument from underdetermination seems to be built on shaky grounds, and 
moreover, that one can agree on this without explicitly bringing in IBE or its likes, is 
generally taken to be bad news for van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Let us now see 
whether this assessment really holds water. 
 
3  Underdetermination in the Scientific Image 
 
It is hard to find a discussion of the argument from UD in which no reference is made to van 
Fraassen. I believe it is fair to claim that he is generally believed to have used the argument 
crucially in his defence of constructive empiricism. Let me suffice with giving one example 
from a much cited recent book in which is stated:  
 
Currently the argument from UTE [underdetermination of theories by evidence] is 
employed centrally by Bas van Fraassen. He suggests that UTE shows that there are 
no reasons for believing more in one than the other of a pair of empirically equivalent 
theoretical descriptions. (Psillos [1999], p. 162) 
 
André Kukla seems to agree in his book on scientific realism, but he adds a caveat: 
 
Yet it’s curiously difficult to locate the exact place in van Fraassen’s writings where 
this argument is presented in fully general form. (Kukla [1998], p. 59) 
 
Nonetheless, Kukla claims that it is possible to reconstruct the argument by pulling together 
different arguments presented separately at different places in van Fraassen’s writings.3  
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that Kukla is cautious enough to add the following remark before offering the full 
reconstruction: “To refer as I do to “van Fraassen’s argument” is to take considerable liberties. The justification 
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 My assessment of this situation will be different. The absence of an explicit statement 
of something like the argument from UD isn’t curious at all, since (a) a careful reading of van 
Fraassen’s writings shows that passages that could be taken as providing pieces of a never 
fully explicated argument play an altogether different role in his expositions; and (b) this is so 
for a good reason, as such an argument is incompatible with his position in epistemology, 
which he dubbed ‘voluntarism;’ and (c) the first traces of this epistemology are already 
present from The Scientific Image (SI) onwards, contrary to what has been claimed by Kukla. 
In this section I will mainly deal with part (a) of my claim, whereas (b) and (c) will be treated 
in the next section. 
 It is not hard to see how one could come to ascribe the argument from UD to van 
Fraassen when considering his SI. In it, he argues for an anti-realist position with respect to 
scientific theories, which holds that accepting a theory only implies believing in its empirical 
adequacy; and while arguing for this position he spends considerable time on showing that 
scientific theories have empirically equivalent rivals. How else could this be interpreted but as 
involving the argument discussed in section 2? Well, it has to. While at pains to deny that the 
canons of rational inference would force us to become scientific realists, van Fraassens 
nowhere in his book claims that it is irrational to be one. I will come back to this issue in the 
next section, but let us for the moment accept that he never endorses the conclusion (UD). 
This implies that the fact that he clearly and undeniably argues for premise (1) stands in need 
for a different rationale. 
 Van Fraassen presents his discussions on empirical equivalence in the third chapter of 
SI, after having spent the first two chapters in presenting what is at stake in the realism 
debate. He has mainly debunked the most important arguments for scientific realism, and he 
has presented in the most general terms what he takes to be the most attractive alternative: 
constructive empiricism. At this point, he announces that he is in need of an improved account 
of the structure of scientific theories, one that is capable of providing a satisfactory answer to 
the question: what is the empirical content of a scientific theory? ([1980], p. 41) 
 I take it that such a goal involves two components. On the one hand, it has to be shown 
that it is logically possible to isolate the empirical content of any theory; on the other hand, it 
has to be made plausible that such a demarcation is potentially relevant. The second 
                                                                                                                                                        
for doing so is that other philosophers have interpreted the passages in question as expositions of an argument.” 
([1998], p. 92) This remark only confirms my claim that the argument is indeed generally ascribed to van 
Fraassen. I want to try to do more, however: to show how these passages should be interpreted from the 
perspective of constructive empiricism. 
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component demands that such an account should square with actual theories: these must have 
a clearly identifiable empirical content which is distinguishable from their total content (by 
using the account’s tools). Van Fraassen’s solution has become commonplace by now: he opts 
for the semantic approach, which avoids many of the linguistic problems associated with 
making a linguistic distinction between observational and theoretical terms.  
 Van Fraassen’s way of showing the feasibility and relevance of the notion of empirical 
content crucially depends on the notion of empirical equivalence, and it is in this context that 
he introduces his much discussed examples of empirically equivalent theories. He basically 
gives two classes of examples: one using fictitious examples, and one using examples taken 
from actual scientific theories. The former are used to show “the feasibility of concepts of 
empirical adequacy and equivalence” ([1980], p. 50), the latter are meant to exemplify in 
more detail how “science itself delineates, at least to some extent, the observable parts of the 
world it describes” ([1980], p. 59), thus nicely accomplishing the two components I discerned 
in the general goal that van Fraassen set himself. 
 There remains to be seen why van Fraassen has recourse to the notion of empirical 
equivalence, while being primarily interested in the question how to isolate the empirical 
content of any theory. The right way to understand this tactic, I believe, is by seeing how it 
enables one to show that the empirical content, thus delineated, is a truly independent 
candidate for belief. In van Fraassen’s own terms: through this move it can be shown that “the 
precise definition of empirical adequacy … does not collapse into the notion of truth.” 
([1980], p. 64) Let us from this perspective have a quick look at the two classes of examples 
introduced by van Fraassen. 
 The most infamous case of empirical equivalence given in SI no doubt is the case of 
the fictitious philosopher Leibniz*, who accepts Newton’s theory as empirically adequate, but 
does not believe it to be true. This is the prime example of a cooked-up empirically equivalent 
rival, as discussed in section 2. The main message that van Fraassen deduces from this 
example, however, is not that therefore one should not believe in Newton’s theory, but only 
that Leibniz*’s attitude is a possible one; that is, that it is logically possible to believe a theory 
to be empirically adequate, without thereby being committed to believe in the truth of at least 
one theory of the class of theories empirically equivalent with Newton’s. He even goes as far 
as to claim that this is “the only important point here” ([1980], p. 47).  
 When discussing examples of actual scientific theories to make his general point of the 
distinctness of empirical adequacy and truth, van Fraassen does so under the heading of 
‘underdetermination’ (the quotation marks are his). However, it becomes clear rather quickly 
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that he does not intend the argument discussed in section 2. All his examples show one theory 
(respectively classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and general relativity) that has truly 
different models that save the same phenomena. The conclusion is that all these theories 
indeed do have extra structure which, on the theories’ own account, does not represent 
observable events. Hence, what a theory says about what is observable is not all that it says: 
its empirical structures are really sub-structures. In van Fraassen’s own words: “In this section 
I have tried to give examples of very basic and general sort of how, in the description of the 
world by a physical theory, we can see a division between that description taken as a whole, 
and the part that pertains to what is observationally determined.” ([1980], p. 63) Remark that 
van Fraassen is only interested in the internal structure of one specific theory. 
 No epistemological considerations enter at all during these discussions of empirical 
equivalence. At this point van Fraassen is clearly interested only in semantic issues, and he 
uses empirical equivalence as a means for making his general point, not as an end in itself. 
The last paragraph of the chapter begins with drawing the main moral to be learned from 
these considerations: 
 
With this new picture of theories in mind, we can distinguish between two epistemic 
attitudes we can take up toward a theory. We can assert it to be true …, and call for 
belief; or we can simply assert its empirical adequacy, calling for acceptance as such. 
([1980], p. 69) 
 
Constructive empiricism is thus shown to be a possible position in philosophy of science. 
Hereupon follows a much-cited epistemological remark, the only one in the whole chapter: 
 
In either case we stick our neck out: empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can 
know at any given time. … Nevertheless there is a difference: the assertion of 
empirical adequacy is a great deal weaker than the assertion of truth, and the restraint 
to acceptance delivers us from metaphysics. (Ibid.) 
 
End of the chapter. 
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4 Van Fraassen’s (early) voluntarism 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that one finds suspiciously little on epistemological matters in SI,4 
van Fraassen was generally taken to argue that it is irrational to be a scientific realist; i.e. the 
conclusion (UD) was ascribed to him. It is now generally accepted that he cannot hold such a 
position anymore, since that would be incoherent given the voluntarist position in 
epistemology that he developed since then. In its most succinct (and incomplete) formulation, 
voluntarism implies that “rationality is only bridled irrationality” (van Fraassen [1989], p. 
172): any behaviour that does not transgress the boundaries of logic – that does not make one 
incoherent – is not irrational. Rationality is all about permission, not about obligation. While 
one is not obligated to become a scientific realist (so much is clearly proven by the arguments 
in SI), the voluntarist will have to admit that it is nevertheless permissible to be one. 
Believing in the truth of scientific theories, even if compelling reasons are lacking, does not 
necessarily make someone incoherent. By adopting voluntarism the argument from UD can be 
of no more avail to an anti-realist. Hence, the general impression is one of an attenuation of 
van Fraassen’s position. André Kukla sums up the situation as follows: 
 
In 1980, constructive empiricism is presented as a conclusion that follows from 
arguments that ought to persuade any rational person to abandon realism. In a 1985 
reply to his critics, van Fraassen equivocates between the relatively strong claims of 
1980 and the permissive turn in his epistemology that is to come. … By 1989, van 
Fraassen explicitly concedes that it isn’t irrational to be a realist. His claim is only that 
it isn’t irrational to be an antirealist. ([Kukla 1998], p. 151) 
 
I strongly believe this view of the matter to be untenable. Nowhere in SI does one find an 
explicit ascription of irrationality to realists; it follows that Kukla’s claim about the arguments 
in SI must be based on an implicit reconstruction of something like the argument from UD. In 
the course of my further assessment of such a reconstruction it will emerge that if one wants 
to impute an epistemological position to van Fraassen in 1980, based on the scattered remarks 
on epistemology in SI, it has to be an embryonic form of something like his later voluntarism.  
                                                 
4 The only section really concerned with epistemological questions is section 4.1 (pp. 71-73), and in it the reader 
is warned by van Fraassen that “I must postpone to another occasion a treatise on epistemology” ([1980], p. 71). 
In a recent look-back, van Fraassen writes: “In The Scientific Image it was hard to stay clear of epistemology, 
though I tried.” ([2001], 164) 
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 The most important clue for ascribing to van Fraassen an analogue principle to the 
epistemological premise (2), which is needed to get the argument from UD from the ground, 
is to be taken from the last sentence of chapter 3 of SI (which I already quoted at the end of 
my section 3). In it van Fraassen claims that the important distinction between believing in the 
empirical adequacy of a theory and in its truth is that the former is a weaker attitude. Coupled 
with the presumed conclusion that any rational person should be a constructive empiricist, this 
gives an epistemological principle that states that one should only believe the weaker claim of 
two claims compatible with all empirical information. (The threat of arbitrarily imposing a 
border immediately looms large, for why should one then still believe in the empirical 
adequacy, rather then restricting belief to a set of logical tautologies…) Some people 
apparently have taken the following much-cited remark of van Fraassen as corroborating the 
ascription of this principle to him:5 
 
There does remain the fact that even in endorsing a simple perceptual judgement, and 
certainly in accepting any theory as empirically adequate, I am sticking my neck out. 
There is no argument there for belief in the truth of the accepted theories, since it is 
not an epistemological principle that one might as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb. 
([1980], p. 72) 
 
Obviously, the claim here is weaker than the presumed epistemological principle (although it 
is consistent with it); even more importantly, the passage quoted continues as follows: 
 
A complete epistemology must carefully investigate the conditions of rationality for 
acceptance of conclusions that go beyond one’s evidence. What it cannot provide, I 
think (and to that extent I am a sceptic), is rationally compelling forces upon these 
epistemic decisions. ([1980], pp. 72-73) 
 
Here we find van Fraassen explicitly denying that there can be epistemic rules that force 
(dis)belief on us! The paragraph from which this quote is taken is dedicated to dispelling the 
suspicion that he is arbitrarily, maybe even incoherently, endorsing a rule that in the right 
situation (e.g. with all relevant evidence in) would compel one to belief in empirical 
                                                 
5 André Kukla, at least, locates this quote as the source for ascriptions of such a principle to van Fraassen 
([1998], p. 94). 
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adequacy, while at the same time denying such a rule the force to compel full belief in the 
theory. I take his answer to be that since belief in empirical adequacy is never forced on us, 
neither can full belief be forced on an agnostic. 
 Remark how far away we have moved from “arguments that ought to persuade any 
rational person to abandon realism.” On the contrary, we find van Fraassen claiming that no 
epistemology can be governed by rules that compel assent, hereby giving us a succinct 
preview of the epistemological position to be further explicated in his later writings. However, 
these latter developments have been taken to imply that van Fraassen has come to see the 
realism debate as irreconcilable (cf. e.g. Kukla [1998]), and one might wonder whether 
ascribing this position to him in 1980 wouldn’t make the debate a non-starter from the 
beginning – apparently denying SI much of its perceived impact. (One important reason why 
the argument from UD has always been attributed to van Fraassen, is undoubtedly that many 
philosophers thought it should have been there: granted that acceptance without full belief is 
possible, this attitude would only be defensible if (UD) would have been established.) 
However, since SI van Fraassen has been stressing that constructive empiricism should be 
seen as a view on science, not as an epistemological position: it doesn’t tell us what we should 
(dis)belief, but it gives an answer to the question “what is science?” by indicating the criteria 
that determine what counts as success in science. Moreover, this view of what the debate on 
scientific realism is about is not a retraction on van Fraassen’s side, but clearly lies at the 
heart of SI. When discussing different possible formulations of scientific realism, van 
Fraassen explicitly favours formulations that focus “on the understanding of the theories 
without reference to reasons for belief” ([1980], p. 7), a preference clearly reflected in his 
final formulations of scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Of course, this 
immediately brings up the further question why one would adopt one view rather than 
another, and van Fraassen clearly thinks that SI does establish that constructive empiricism is 
the best view. It is therefore time to round up my discussion of the arguments in SI by 
providing what I take to be the most interesting way to see what they establish when seen in 
their complete argumentative context.  
 I take it that the positive argument for constructive empiricism, as expounded in SI, 
consists of the following four components.  
 (1) One can distinguish between two different attitudes one can take up towards a 
theory: accepting it and believing it. This is established by the arguments showing that it is 
always possible to isolate the empirical content of a theory. Constructive empiricism is a 
possible position. 
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 (2) There are never compelling reasons to opt for full belief in scientific theories. This 
is established by van Fraassen’s critical discussions (in chapter 2 of SI) of rules that could be 
taken to provide such reasons (such as inference to the best explanation), coupled with his 
more general denial of the possibility of epistemologically compelling rules (which would 
threaten to make the decision to accept without full belief arbitrary or even incoherent). 
(Incidentally, when summarizing the result of his discussions in the second chapter of SI, van 
Fraassen states: “I resisted such inference [to the truth of a theory], arguing in effect that when 
the theory has implications about what is not observable, the evidence does not warrant the 
conclusion that it is true.” ([1980], p. 71) This could be taken as throwing doubts on my 
ascription of a proto-voluntarism to van Fraassen in 1980, and might be given a strong 
reading as claiming that it is irrational to believe in the truth of theories. However, nowhere 
does van Fraassen indicate how he intends the term “warrant” to be understood, whereas his 
claim that there can be no compelling forces upon epistemic decisions about claims going 
beyond one’s evidence is unambiguous and inconsistent with such a strong reading. 
Moreover, when we look at the places where he discusses such purported compelling reasons, 
he always opts for a cautious reading of what his discussions establish.6) Constructive 
empiricism thus wouldn’t make science – as conceived by it – an eminently arbitrary or even 
irrational practice. 
 (3) One can understand all aspects of scientific methodology perfectly well from the 
viewpoint that the main criterion for scientific success is empirical adequacy (this is mainly 
established in chapters 4 and 5 of SI, although some of the discussions in chapter 2 are 
relevant as well). The distinction between acceptance and belief can be put to good use in 
making sense of scientific practice. Hence, constructive empiricism is an attractive position, 
which “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” ([1980], p. 
73). 
 (4) For an empiricist constructive empiricism is also the best view of science: it not 
only makes sense of science, “it does so without inflationary metaphysics.” (Ibid.) Of course, 
a realist will not see the metaphysics accrued to believing scientific theories as inflationary, 
and van Fraassen is here stating what it means for him to be an empiricist, rather than 
                                                 
6 “[W]e can still say that there is no need to believe good theories to be true” ([1980], pp. 11-12); “I shall just 
conclude that it is, on the face of it, not irrational to commit oneself only to a search for theories that are 
empirically adequate” ([ibid.], p. 19); “Merely following the ordinary patterns of inference in science does not 
obviously and automatically makes realists of us all.” ([ibid.], p. 23); “The [realist’s] decision to leap is subject 
to rational scrutiny, but not dictated by reason and evidence.” ([ibid.], p. 37) 
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providing us with an argument to become one. As he is an empiricist, and as he accordingly 
can think that everybody should be one, he can proclaim that the best view on science is 
constructive empiricism. In the end, this comes down to a deeply value-laden judgement. I 
will come back to this point in Section 5.2. 
 It is clear that the distinction between accepting and believing a theory is central to the 
constructive empiricist view on science. As I explained, van Fraassen’s discussions of 
empirical equivalence are used to show this to be a viable distinction. Some could argue, 
however, that the only argument why one would want to make such a distinction seems to lie 
in the fact that it makes possible constructive empiricism. Accordingly, it can be claimed (as 
has been done by Horwich [1991]) that such a distinction remains utterly artificial if no 
independent argument for the relevance of this distinction can be provided. It is important to 
take up this challenge since Horwich also suggests that the only reason for distinguishing 
between pragmatic and epistemic virtues lies in the argument from underdetermination 
([1991], pp. 1,11). 
 
5 Acceptance vs. Belief 
 
In a number of publications following upon SI van Fraassen develops a simple, but at first 
sight effective line of argument to show that we need to distinguish between the attitudes of 
accepting and believing a theory ([1983a,1983b,1983c,1985]). The position of SI thereby 
seems to be considerably strengthened. It will be seen, however, that the argument fails to 
establish its intended goal. Nevertheless, this analysis will provide us with a better 
understanding of how acceptance and belief are intimately related for a constructive 
empiricist.  
 
5.1 The Simple Argument 
 
Van Fraassen’s simple argument goes as follows: 
 (1) Scientific theories are accepted because they have certain virtues. Nothing is 
 presupposed about what such acceptance implies; this will depend on the nature of 
 these virtues. 
 (2) We can distinguish at least two classes of virtues, based on a quick glance of  how 
theories are assessed. Theories are praised because they provide us with  information (e.g. 
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they enable explanations), and they are praised because there is a  considerable chance that 
they are true. Hence theories can have informational and  confirmational virtues.  
 (3) Although up to this point we did not prejudge the matter concerning the 
 relationship between these two classes of virtues, we will have to conclude that 
 informational virtues cannot be confirmational virtues. Consider a theory T and a 
 part of it, T’: T will always score at least as good on informational virtues. 
 However, a part of a theory can never be less likely to be true than the theory itself 
 (this is basic logical point: since T is logical stronger it has less models, implying 
 that it has more ways to be false). Hence, T cannot score better on confirmational 
 virtues. Informational virtues are not always at the same time confirmational 
 virtues. 
 (4) Since informational virtues are reasons for accepting a theory, reasons for 
 acceptance are not always reasons for belief. 
 (5) Acceptance is not belief, since both notions are governed by a different logic. 
Since it is a basic logical point that strength and probability of being true pull in different 
directions, it follows that reasons for accepting a theory cannot always be reasons for 
believing it. Before pointing out why this argument fails, let me quickly dispel the doubt that 
it might implicitly be based on an argument from underdetermination. We are only comparing 
the semantic relations between one theory and some part of it. In no way does this show how 
we should compare different theories with respect to the credence they can rationally be 
accorded; neither does it show that we cannot or need not believe in more than the empirical 
adequacy of a theory – remark that empirical adequacy is even nowhere mentioned in the 
argument. We are only investigating the logic of the notions acceptance and belief, not the 
relation between belief and possible evidential grounds. 
 The quick way to see that the argument must fail to establish its conclusion, that 
acceptance and belief are genuinely distinct, is by noticing that the same tension holds for any 
belief. We want our beliefs to be true, but we can only be sure that we shun error at the 
expense of foregoing all beliefs in non-tautological propositions. But we don’t want to believe 
only tautologies, we do want (true) beliefs that give us information that we value. This means, 
however, that we will always have reasons for believing a proposition that cannot be ipso 
facto reasons for believing it to be true. The Gordian knot can only be cut by a value-driven 
decision. This is of course a classical pragmatist point, with which van Fraassen completely 
agrees, since it lies at the core of his voluntarism. But then, what becomes of the argument 
that belief and acceptance should be distinguished because they are governed by a different 
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logic? When confronted with a similar point made by Paul Teller, van Fraassen responds as 
follows (the “ulterior motives” referred to are the reasons for holding a belief that cannot be 
reasons for believing it to be true): 
 
A belief held for ulterior motives is still a belief. It does not become acceptance 
instead of belief that way. The distinction between what a person believes and what 
s/he merely accepts is not made on the basis of why s/he has that attitude but on the 
basis of what that attitude is. (van Fraassen [2001], p. ???) 
 
This is clearly a retreat on van Fraassen’s side. Acceptance and belief are distinct attitudes, 
because they are, not because we can show that they have to be. I will not further go into the 
question whether and how this distinction could be further fleshed out, but I think that to deny 
the reality of such a distinction would impoverish our epistemic life to such an extent as to 
become totally uninteresting from a philosophical point of view. Moreover, it seems to me 
that such a denial would rather conduct to full-blooded pragmatism than to scientific realism, 
since the notion of acceptance would seem to be the only acceptable placeholder for this 
unified epistemic attitude (belief would be deprived of too many of its connotations if all 
ulterior motives would undiscriminating lead to belief). 
 
5.2 Belief Reconsidered 
 
For the moment, let us accept with van Fraassen that belief and acceptance are genuinely 
distinct attitudes, and investigate what we can learn from the failure of his simple argument. 
Remember that the argument failed because it had to be conceded that belief in any 
proposition or theory is subject to the same tension which van Fraassen wanted to ascribe to 
acceptance. Obviously this has consequences for how we can understand the nature of 
epistemic virtues and their relation with pragmatic virtues.  
 Let me begin with making a crude distinction between both kinds of virtues, as van 
Fraassen wants to understand them. When scientists want to assess whether the aim of science 
has been achieved (to some extent) for a particular theory, they will look at how it scores on 
epistemic virtues. When they assess whether that theory has other valuable characteristics 
they will have a look at its pragmatic virtues.  
 How can scientists ever come to have a belief about a scientific theory? As the above 
analysis showed, this will always raise the question which beliefs they value – if there were 
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no valuable beliefs, the only sensible thing to do would be to believe only tautologies. This 
pragmatic value-driven decision then sets the stakes for the next question: do they have 
enough evidence for these beliefs – i.e. how does the theory score on virtues relevant for the 
epistemic goal set by that decision.  
 The assessment whether a theory has other valuable characteristics is prima facie not 
susceptible to the same tension: having a low logical strength is not valued in itself – for the 
decision made on the ground of pragmatic virtues there is not the same risk of being in error. 
Whereas belief about a theory will always be the result of both a value-driven decision and 
the theory’s epistemic virtues, acceptance of the theory will be the result of this belief and the 
theory’s pragmatic virtues. We can see that acceptance is only indirectly subject to the tension 
that van Fraassen ascribed to it in his simple argument. This argument apparently had things 
upside down. 
 The insight that it is primarily belief that is subject to this tension can help us to better 
discern the exact nature of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Any scientific decision to 
accept a theory, and hence to believe that it achieves (to a certain extent) its epistemic goal, 
involves a prior decision as to what beliefs are valuable. The constructive empiricist view on 
science implies that while individual scientists may value many kinds of beliefs, as scientists 
– i.e. as persons engaged in a common practice – they must value belief in the empirical 
adequacy of theories as an overriding goal. By subscribing to the correctness of the 
constructive empiricist view on science, one adopts the view that science is driven by 
empiricist sentiments.7 This also implies that the epistemic virtues will have to be empirical 
virtues – and empirical virtues only. 
 By now it should be clear why empiricists can take such a delight in the constructive 
empiricist view on science. It enables them to portray scientific activity as the paradigm of 
what they take to be a sensible epistemic enterprise. They can see their own values as 
underlying science. Of course, any individual, be it a scientist or a philosopher, can always 
opt for a stronger belief than the belief that a theory is empirically adequate, but the empiricist 
will have “disdain”8 for this decision. These beliefs are “not additionally vulnerable,”9 and 
                                                 
7 We can retract what van Fraassen takes the core nature of these sentiments to be from various places in his 
writings, e.g.: “All our factual beliefs are to be given over as hostages to fortune, to the fortunes of future 
empirical evidence, and given up when they fail…” (van Fraassen [2002] , p. 63). The context in which this is 
proclaimed is important. This is not an empiricist teaching to scientists how they should behave; this is an 
empiricist trying to learn from science what his proper epistemic attitudes should be.  
8 van Fraassen [1985], p. 252. 
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hence not valuable from his perspective. A realist of course will retort that these beliefs are 
valuable, since they allow us to have a more satisfying world picture, one that is more unified 
etc. It is precisely at this point that the debates become irresolvable. Irresolvable, but not 
senseless, I would urge – unless one would want to forego all debates concerning values. At 
this point, however, we are entering a different debate, one concerning the question what we 
should believe, rather than what the nature of science is. 10 
 
5.3 Epistemic vs. Pragmatic Virtues 
 
Let me now answer a suspicion that might have arisen with some readers, and that was 
explicitly raised by Horwich [1991]. Doesn’t the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic 
virtues presuppose the validity of UD? Is the distinction between acceptance and belief hence 
not predicated upon the acceptance of the argument from UD? Have a look at the following 
typical statement by van Fraassen: 
 
… pragmatic virtues do not give us any reason over and above the evidence of the 
empirical data, for thinking that a theory is true. ([1980], p. 4) 
 
If this were indeed accepted by van Fraassen on the ground of UD, this would lead to one of 
these regresses that are so typical for the debates on scientific realism. To reach the 
conclusion (UD) from the premises (1) and (2) (see section 2), one would need to have this 
distinction between pragmatic and epistemic virtues already in place (to argue that non-
empirical virtues do not break the epistemic ties between empirically equivalent theories). But 
one cannot use the conclusion UD in defence of one of its premises! If this were how things 
stand, van Fraassen would be guilty of the same kind of question begging that he so skilfully 
laid bare in the realist’s arguments.  
                                                                                                                                                        
9 van Fraassen [1985], p. 255. 
10 Is it possible to come up with one right view on the aim of science? Ironically, van Fraassen, the arch-
nominalist, seems to be trapped in an essentialist position with respect to science. (For the centrality of 
nominalism to van Fraassen’s thinking, witness the discussion between Ladyman [2000], and Monton and van 
Fraassen [2003].) This issue hangs closely together with the separation that van Fraassen has to make between 
the intentionality of a scientist participating in the enterprise of science, and the intention of any individual 
scientist (see Rosen [1994], and van Fraassen [1994]). One could also question the unitary view on science that 
van Fraassen seems to endorse. 
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 In SI, van Fraassen mainly concentrates on arguing that explanatoriness is a pragmatic 
virtue, in the sense explained in the quote above. As I see it, he uses two tactics to this end, 
one mainly rhetorical, the other substantial. The rhetorical tactic, no doubt very effective, 
consists in placing the onus on the realist. Why would the fact that a theory offers (very) good 
explanations give us reason, over and above the evidence of the empirical data, for thinking 
that a theory is true (as the realist would have it)? How would that connection precisely look 
like (which kind of explanations would qualify, etc.)? Besides these scattered remarks, van 
Fraassen also develops a positive argument. This consists in developing an alternative account 
of explanation which supposedly does full justice to scientific practice. This account implies 
that explanation is not some irreducible goal, separated from considerations of empirical 
adequacy and strength. It is a goal, but not one overriding the demand of empirical adequacy. 
The success of an explanation is always the success of an empirically adequate and 
informative description ([1980], p. 157). This account of explanation is presented as 
descriptive of good scientific practice. On van Fraassen’s view it is thus science itself that 
shows us that pragmatic virtues are distinct from epistemic ones, in the sense that the latter are 
primary. Of course, one can quarrel about the adequacy of van Fraassen’s account of 
explanation, but since here I am mainly interested in laying bare his argumentative strategy, I 
will not enter into these debates.  
 
6 In Conclusion 
 
It has already been stressed sufficiently that constructive empiricism is not presented as an 
epistemological position. It does not tell us under what conditions we would be justified in 
believing certain scientific claims. There is, however, also a truly constructive part about the 
position. It tries to formulate answers to questions such as: how do scientists construct their 
theories, why do they impose certain demands on these theories, which role does the demand 
for explanations play in their activity…. In conclusion, constructive empiricism should 
primarily be seen as a view on methodology. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the 
argument from UD nowhere figures among van Fraassen’s arguments for his position.  
 The reason why so many authors have nevertheless succumbed to the temptation of 
ascribing the argument to van Fraassen, should have been clarified by the reconstruction 
offered here. The argument from UD and van Fraassen’s arguments in SI do share a common 
premise, the main difference being that van Fraassen does not directly build an ethics of belief 
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on that premise. It is connected with such an ethics, but, as has become clear, in a much more 
subtle way. 
 It follows that laying bare problems with the argument from UD turns out to be a less 
promising tactic to use for realists. After concluding that the argument fails to deliver its 
promised goods, Samir Okasha, e.g., claims “a victory by default for the scientific realist” 
(Okasha [2002], p. 306). This default is clearly undercut, but that is not necessarily all. My 
reconstruction of van Fraassen’s argument also points the way to other possible anti-realist 
positions. It should be remarked, for instance, that no heavy weight was put on the precise 
nature of the distinction between sub-structures and “theoretical” super-structures. One can 
thus imagine someone proposing an anti-realist position more or less along the lines presented 
here, but without accepting van Fraassen’s demarcation of the observable. There is a broader 
class of anti-realism that does not need the argument from UD. Anti-realists should rejoice 
over this. 
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